I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

10th Annual AIAAlUSU Conference on Small Satellites
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Abstract
Many programs presented at prior USU
meetings have been exceptionally successful
at reducing the cost of space missions.
Typically this is done by a variety of
mechanisms that change fundamental
characteristics of how business is done in
space. (The missions flown do not literally
reproduce their more expensive predecessors, or they would have not have been able
to significantly reduce cost.) Thus, a critical
question arises What is the price of low
cost? What do we give up in order to
achieve the advantage of dramatically
lower cost?
This paper examines the 10 case study
space missions presented in the new book,
Reducing Space Mission Cost. Relative to
the projections of traditional cost models
(our best estimate of "should have cost"),
these missions reduced total program cost by
50% to more than 90%.
Cost reductions have come about in alI
mission segments-the spacecraft bus,
payload, launch, ground segment, and
t Copyright © 1996 Microcosm, Inc.
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mission operations. This paper summarizes
the cost reduction methods employed by
these missions to provide a first answer to
the title question.

Background
Microcosm has recently completed work
en a three year project for the U.S. Air
Force Academy to examine and document
methods for reducing the cost of space
missions. The result of this activity is th e
book Reducing Space Mission Cost (RSMC)*
[1] which contains ten detailed case studies
of both past and ongoing missions that have
been successful in reducing cost relative to
more traditional programs. The missions
themselves are very diverse, falling into
three broad categories:
AMSATs:
AO-13
AO-16
Other LEO:
0rsted
Freja
SAMPEX
HETE
RADCAL
ORBCOMM
PoSat-l
Interplanetary:
Oementine
Pluto Exp.

Amateur radio
Amateur radio
Danish mag. field mission
Swedish magnetosph. sat
First SMEX small explorer
High-energy science mission
Radar Calibration satellite
Comm. system test
Portuguese tech. transfer
Lunar I asteroid test satellite
Fast mission to Pluto

Because of the book development process,
much of the material was written in
parallel. Many of the case studies were
among the last items to be finished and,
although the discussion of the technology
methods draws heavily on the case studies,
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there was no opportunity in the book itself
to summarize the results of the fully
completed case study work. Thus, a
principal purpose of this paper is to review
the complete set of case studies and to
summarize and evaluate the methods used
by these missions to reduce cost.
This work should be viewed as the
beginning of a long-term work in progress.
For many years, people have brought
anecdotal data to the Utah State
Conference and other meetings to describe
specific methods, philosophies, technology
and management approaches for reducing
mission cost. What is needed is to begin th e
process of critically examining what low
cost really means and how to go about
achieving it. We need to look at what has
worked in the community as a whole, w ha t
is working, and what new methods people
are proposing. We also need to try and
understand the real processes at work. The
fact that a particular organization can
significantly reduce cost does not necessarily
mean that they understand fully what was
responsible for that success. Building a
space mission is a remarkably complex
process. In the end, each mission achieves a
level of results at a specific cost. But it may
not be at all clear, even to those who have
done it, how this result differs from more
traditional space missions, or what specific
techniques contributed most to achieving
the cost objective.
Before looking at the results, we need to
point out the importance of what the case
study authors have accomplished, and the
difficulty of the task which they undertook. Many of us write professional papers
about the technology we have developed
and the merits of our particular approach.
In contrast, we have asked the case study
authors to reveal significant cost data
associated with their program and to
examine carefully both what works and
what doesn't work in reducing cost. Clearly,
these issues are sensitive and get at some of
the most critical features which distinguish
one contractor from another. Nonetheless,
the case study authors have recognized the
importance of making this information
available to the community. We sincerely
hope that these assessments will encourage

others to do the same so that our community
as a whole can look carefully at what works
and what doesn't work and make technical
judgments based an real cost data rather
than qualitative generalities. Ultimately,
reducing mission cost requires that we look
at real cost, just as reducing mass requires
that we start with a real mass budget.

What is Low Cost?
The Utah State University conference is
compelling evidence tha t large cost
reductions are possible. Many of the reports
at this conference are an programs that are
dramatically lower cost than more traditional approaches achieving comparable
results. We believe most of the individuals
at the USU conference would concur with
these statements. However, a fundamental
problem arises when we ask what does this
really mean? What is low cost, lower cost,
reduced cost? What qualifies a program,
other than unverifiable claims, to say that
it is truly reduced cost?
One key to this question is to recognize
tha t no one starts out to create a high cost
program. In oUI experience, waste and fraud
are not rampant in the space industry. Good
decisions are made in virtually all space
programs with the fundamental objective of
achieving the most cost-effective solution
possible to the requirements that have been
established.
A large fraction of space products are
bought on competitive bids and the contract
is awarded to the company that can
achieve the stated objectives at minimum
cost. Consequently, "low-cost" clearly means
something different than simply buying the
same product for less money. Almost by
definition, a "Low-Cost Space Telescope"
will not be the same instrument or the same
spacecraft as the "real" Space Telescope.
There is no compelling evidence that Space
Telescope itself could have been built for
significantly less than the actual amounts
expended. One could, of course, always be a
bit more efficient, or beat a bit more profit
out of the various contractors, or require
more uncompensated overtime from th e
engineers. But clearly this process will
have only a minor impact on cost. It will not
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create the dramatic changes that we are
seeking or that we believe have occurred in
low-cost missions.

cost models for that IIUSSlon. Thus, Pluto
Express, at an estimated cost of $150
million, might be regarded as expensive, but
qualifies as a reduced cost mission by the
standards of traditional interplanetary
missions.

If low-cost does not mean buying the
same spacecraft or grotmd system for less
money, then there are clearly a series of key
questions to address:

•
•
•
•
•

Finally, we define a low-cost mission as
one for which the life cycle cost is
substantially less than the average cost of a
space mission of that type. This, of course,
means that we must have in mind some idea
of what we mean by average cost. This will
depend 00. the type of mission, how the
spacecraft is built, and the time frame in
which it is built. For concreteness, Table 1
provides a working definition of what we
mean by low-cost space missions in the
RSMC context.

What does low cost really mean?
Which organizations or groups are
achieving it?
How do they do it?
What is the price of low cost?
What can the government do to avoid
screwing the process up?

To begin, we need to establish what we
mean by traditional and low-cost missions.
This is done using cost models which have
historically been used to provide purely
empirical estimates of what it costs to build
Class

With these definitions, we can begin to
understand Hlow-cost" in more concrete
terms. The next two tables, also from RSMC,
summarize the actual costs of the 10 case

Typical Cost 1

Low Cost Typical Mission

Low Cost Mission

Low·Earth orbit

$150M to $2,OOO+M

<$50M

DMSP,GRO

Alexis, Freja

Geosynchronous

$250M to $2,500+M

<$75M

Intelsat, TDRS

Ball GEO comsat 2

Interplanetary

$1 ,500M to $3,OOO+M

<$SOOM

Galileo, Casini

Clementine

1 Life-cycle cost includiDg development, spacecraft, lauDch, and operatioDs
2 Proposed, but not built

TABLE 1.

Empirical definition of a low-cost mission. As a working definition we refer t>
a mission as "Iow-cosf' if it is 3 or more times less expensive 1han typical missions in
that class. (from RSMC [1]).

and fly spacecraft. Cost models ignore the
subtleties of how things are built in order to
try and answer the fundamental question of
what a new mission will cost if we know
relatively little about it except perhaps its
mass, orbit, and basic mission parameters. A
large number of cost models are available.
For our purposes, we will use the one defined
in Chapter 20 of Space Mission Analysis
and Design, 2nd edition, (SMAD) [2] because
it is widely available and easy to use and
apply. We define a traditional space
mISSIOn
as one which approximately
follows the design rules and cost estimates
presented in SMAD.
In contrast to the traditional mission, we
define a reduced cost mission as one for
which the life cycle cost is substantially
lower than that predicted by traditional

study IIUSSIOns (Table 2) and their costs
relative to the SMAD cost model (Table 3).
All of the values have been inflated to
constant FY95 dollars. It is important to
recognize that this approach makes ro
claim to cost effectiveness or what a
spacecraft should cost for what it does. The
SMAD model is simply the best empirical
data 00. what a mission spacecraft would
cost if built by traditional means.
Consequently, Table 3 is our best estimate of
what the actual costs are relative to a
traditional space program. The conclusion is
that the case study missions have reduced
total mission cost by 500;0 to more than 90%
with respect to projections by traditional
cost models.
It is also important to recognize th a t
Tables 2 and 3 are not meant to provide a
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comparison between the specific low-cost
missions. Each mission was developed under
unique rules, regulations, and guidelines
which define what can be achieved and
how it must be done. The mission payloads
were dramatically different and their
performance in tenns of scientific and
technical return have been different as
well. Thus, we cannot legitimately use this
table to say that one mission is better than
another. However, we can use it to say that
the approaches used by the organizations
that developed the case study missions are
capable of reducing cost substantially
relative to more traditional missions.

How Do They Do It?
Given that the organizations represented in the case study missions can
achieve results at dramatically lower cost
than traditional programs, how do they do
it? Perhaps the most important conclusion is
that there is no single common solution
among the organizations. There is no one
method or process which is common to all of
the organizations that substantially reduce
cost and no way to fit them into a common
mold. Some organizations will prefer to buy
rather than build to avoid reinventing
what has already been developed. Others
will build if they possibly can, en the
grounds that they can control the cost,
schedule, and performance and have the
equipment available to meet specific
spacecraft needs. In addition, answers need
to be interpreted in the context of
individual programs and organizations. In a
very real sense, the only common
denominator among the organizations is
that they all put substantial importance at
and real effort into the process of reducing
cost.
The broad methods of reducing cost used
by the case study organizations are given In
Table 4 and their use en the case study
missions are summarized in Table 5. Specific
are
elements of design philosophy
summarized in Table 6. These tables are
intended to provide an overview of what is
done within the case study organizations.
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize
that it is the implementation of these rules
within the context of each organization

that really matters. For example, nearly
all of the organizations emphasize
minimizing documentation. This responds to
the general perception that there is
excessive documentation within most space
programs. Nonetheless, it is equally clear
that all of the organizations recognize the
importance of having good documentation
that records what has actually occurred.
AMSAT, for example, has a continuous
running log containing essentially all of th e
documentation for all of the components.
This set of ringbinders becomes a complete
description of the as-built spacecraft, such
that any problems which arise on orbit can
be immediately addressed in terms of the
equipment which is, in fact, on board.
As one would expect, many of the cost
reduction issues revolve around people and
staffing. It is people, and not processes,
policy, or regulations that ultimately make
spacecraft work and reduce mission cost One
of the important methods that we had left
out of our summary in the book itself was
the empowerment of mission teams to make
decisions. The authors reminded us of this
several times and frequently pointed out
that the empowerment of teams was a key
issue.

On the other hand, we had thought
that a key issue would be creating
incentives-that is, finding ways to
incentivize the staff to successfully reduce
cost. None of the organizations identified
this as one of the techniques which they
used. Nonetheless, one of the most apparent
characteristics of the organizations that
create small low-cost satellites relative to
the more traditional organization is the
high level of motivation of the individuals
involved. The individuals are motivated,
committed, and want to make the project
occur and see it succeed at low cost. To us,
this implies that the organizations have
provided substantial incentives. It is
simply that these incentives are not bonuses
or monetary rewards but much more strongly
linked to psychological benefits, such as
individual
responsibility,
pride,
motivation to see something accomplished,
and the desire to be part of a team that has
achieved something which others have not.
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processes and in bidding against fixed
requirements, and more emphasis rn
working with people to achieve results and
ensure higher reliability. This begins to
suggest a part of the difficulty associated
with either government programs or large
commercial bureaucracies in which the
emphasis is on procedures and regulations to
maintain quality or reduce cost. As th e
AMSAT case study has clearly proven,
contracts, regulations, and policies are
simply nowhere near as effective as
motivated people.

While the summaries in these tables are
important, it is also clear that it is the
method by which they are applied that is
most important. In order to make these
approaches work within your organization,
it is important to understand what has been
done and how it has been done in order to
achieve appropriate results. There is ro
single "right" method, but simply a variety
of approaches, each of which can be made
to work within the circumstances in which
they are applied. For each space mission
that we have studied, multiple methods
and approaches are used, and in the end
methods are chosen which work within th e
context of that organization.

The distinction between "low cost" and
"cost effective" is important but also
potentially misleading. "Cost effectiveness," while a worthwhile goal, all too
often serves as a euphemism for business as
usual. Being "cost effective" is sometimes
what we do if we don't want to undertake
the hard work of genuinely reducing cost.

What is the Price
of Low Cost?
The section above summarizes the
methods that organizations have used. to
substantially reduce space mission cost. The
net result of this process is a mission which
is cheaper, but which is also different than
a traditional mISSIOn. Fundamentally,
there is a price to reducing cost. To make
dramatic reductions in cost people and
organizations have to behave differently.
There has to be less emphasis on rules and

Keeping the above danger in mind, we
can distinguish between a low-cost program
and one which is cost effective with Figure
1, which shows perfonnance measured in
some quantitative fashion on the vertical
axis versus cost on the horizontal axis. The
only assumption for this curve is that there
is a non-zero cost associated with putting
Performance vs. Cost

7~------------------------------------------------~
6

High Performance
Option

Optimal Performance
per Unit Cost ~

\

,,
I

Design-to-Requlrements

,1

I
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,,1 ---+--- Deslgn-to-Cost

,
,,
,,

,,

,
,,

,,

,

__-+__ Low Cost Option

,1

o ~------4-------~-------+-----~---------~~----~30
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10
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5
o
Cost (arbitrary units)

Fig. 1 The Range of Cost Options. For the underlying curve, we assume that
there is a minimum cost to launch anything into orbit. Beyond that, the
cost of additiona.l performance is proportional to the performance already
achieved. See text for discussion.
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anything in orbit, and that beyond that the
cost of
improving
performance
is
proportional to the level of perfonnance we
already have. This results in a decaying
exponential in which the performance of
very low-cost programs can be improved by
adding relatively small amounts of money
and the perfonnance of high-cost programs
can be improved only by large cost increases.
By definition, the most cost effective
program is the one with the greatest
performance per unit cost. This is the
program represented by the tangent to the
curve which passes through the origin. This
gives us the maximum performance per unit
cost. Programs significantly below this are
"low cost" and are less than optimal in the
short run.
Low-cost programs which are less than
optimal in the short nm may still be the
most efficient in the long nm. If essentially
all of the satellites retain their utility
throughout their entire design life, then
designmg to the tangent point in Figure 1
makes sense. However, if many satellites
are lost due to obsolescence, operational
errors, failures, launch mishaps, or other
factors unrelated to the spacecraft itself,
then it may be that a series of lower cost
spacecraft, in which the cost of the losses
are minimized, will be more efficient than
the inherently more expensive, costeffective spacecraft. In the extreme, let's
assume that we know that there will be a
15% launch failure rate. Using a series of
low-cost, less-efficient satellites, we can
accommodate the failure rate by building
15% more satellites or, to be exceptionally
conservative, 30% more. If, instead, we
build a single, efficient, cost-effective large
satellite, we now have a 15% probability
that the entire capability will be lost.
What is the real price of low-cost?
What do we give up to achieve a low-cost
mission? The first order evidence is as
follows:
Reliability is Not Sacrificed

Both low-cost spacecraft and high-cost
spacecraft experience failures, some of
which are recoverable and some of which
are not. Although there is no good
statistical evidence, the anecdotal evidence

suggests the failure rates are approximately the same between the two
categories, with a slight advantage in
reliability to the very low-cost missions.
We believe that this comes about because
the low-cost missions are smaller, simpler,
have far fewer parts, larger margins, and
fewer failure modes. All things being equal,
we would expect a smaller number of
failures from such spacecraft. In addition,
the designers are not pushed to optimize
performance and, therefore, will opt
instead to provide "excessive" margins in
order to ensure successful performance.
Getting Exactly What You Want is
Sacrificed

Buying a low-cost spacecraft
is
comparable to buying a family car. We don't
write down detailed specifications and then
asking who can build such a car. We look at
our approximate budget, evaluate what is
available en the market, and select a car
which is some compromise between what we
want and what we can afford. It is exactly
this process that goes into buying low-cost
spacecraft or other mission components. The
result is that we meet most of our objectives
at far lower cost, but we do so in part by
giving up the ability to demand specific
perfonnance levels.
Optimal Performance is Sacrtficed
On the whole, small and low-cost
spacecraft will be less efficient than larger
ones, because the design is less than
optimal. The attitude control system, for
example, will be a larger percentage of the
spacecraft mass for a less accurate system
than will be the case in a large spacecraft.
The same applies for other subsystems. The
net result is that the spacecraft bus is a
larger percentage of the spacecraft than i t
would be en a more traditional mission.
Consequently, the mass remaining for the
payload is smaller. Reducing the spacecraft
bus cost has forced us to reduce even more the
spacecraft resources available to the
payload and, consequently, the overall
mission performance.
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Control and Accountability are

Sacr~ficed

The government is often interested not so
much in low cost as in cost accountability.
What the govenunent wants is frequently
ironclad contracts with cost guarantees and
performance penalties. However, this is not
the type of contract that genuinely produces
low-cost systems. Low-cost is more likely to
be achieved by giving organizations and
individuals a significant level of freedom,
challenging them to minimize cost, and
being willing to accept or work with the
results. Thus, a key question for any program
interested in reducing cost is, do you truly
want to achieve low cost or are you more
interested in having control, accountability,
and someone to hang if there is an overrun?

Cost Effectiveness is Sacrificed-in the Short
Run
In the short nm., it is likely that the
most cost effective way to do university
research would be to give all of the research
dollars available to :MIT, Cal Tech, and
Stanford. These are strong organizations
with creative individuals that will use the
research dollars to produce results.
Nonetheless, while this can work in the
short run, it is unlikely that it will provide
the best results for the nation in the long
nm.. It is the competition among ideas, and
the ability of the innovator, small
entrepreneur, or individual researcher to
challenge the existing paradigm th a t
produces breakthroughs and dramatic
results. These breakthroughs and new ways
of thinking are critical to success. Nonetheless, they rarely occur in the most
mainstream programs or most widely
accepted approaches to working problems.

How Can the Government
Avoid Damaging the
Process?
Making dramatic reductions in space
mission cost is essentially a creative or
inventive process. "Labor-saving gadgets"
are the cliche for what people invent in
their garage. As can be seen from the case
studies, creative spacecraft engineers ask

themselves "how can I get this done with
limited resources and not much time?" As
with almost all inventions, the solution
may, or may not, work as intended every
time. Nonetheless, the record of the
SmallSat community is extremely good,
which indicates that in most cases this
creative process is alive and well, and
functioning nicely.
Unfortunately, most of the elements
which nurture the inventive and creative
process are hard to find in large organizations and government. It is extremely
difficult to manage creativity or to write a
task order to invent a new way of doing
something in sixty man hours and by the end
of next week. The bottom line is that policy
and regulation can do an enormous amount to
screw up the process and prevent it from
moving forward, but can do relatively little
to advance it.
An excellent example of this dichotomy
comes from recent Microcosm experience in
the area of space launch, a major cost
element for small, low-cost satellites. We
believe we have an excellent approach to
dramatically reducing small satellite
launch cost. (Whether our approach is
actually a good one and will work in the
long nm is immaterial to the policy issues
involved. We certainly believe it is a strong
approach.) In early 1996, NASA ad~
istrator Dan Goldin expressed frustration
with the launch community and announced
the need for near-term development of what
he termed a Bantam Lift Vehicle, capable
of putting 200 Ibs into LEO for less than $1
million. Microcosm believes that we can do
this. For a non-recurring development cost on
the order of $6 million (depending, of
course, on specific requirements and
contractual issues), we believe we can
develop such a vehicle in approximately 24
months.

Unfortunately, in a broad sense, no one is
interested. NASA is willing to invest
several tens of millions of dollars in
technology so that industry can get there,
but by policy NASA is not permitted to
develop a vehicle, unless it is reusable.
Expendable vehicles are the province of
DoD. Unfortunately, DoD does not have a
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requirement for light lift, but only medium
lift and heavy lift. DoD believes their
needs will be met by the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). They
have no interest in looking at light lift.

low-cost or achieving results. Avoiding the
appearance of duplication and wastefulness
is more important than fostering a diversity
of opinion in looking for creative solutions to
problems.

In addition, there is also an unwritten
policy that industry should do near-term
vehicle development on its own and that
government should be spending its resources
looking at long-term solutions and
developing technology. The net result of
this space policy is remarkably frustrating.
Microcosm wastes
scarce
marketing
resources; groups that want to launch small
spacecraft are frustrated by dramatically
high costs; and the government is spending
millions of dollars trying to invent
technology to do something which we
believe can already be done. Irrespective of
the technical merits or demerits, the policy
is a mess.

We believe that the policy problems
associated with reducing space mission costs
are very real. In the end, the public
perception of what the government is doing
is equally or more important than obtaining
specific results. Within the government
process, rewards go to very conservative
approaches which minimize risk rather
than to approaches which may produce
spectacular results or spectacular failures.

Unfortunately, we believe this example
is not an isolated incident, but is indicative
of a broad problem with space policy
approaches. Many of the most common
approaches used by the government have
the potential of being counterproductive in
tha t they are more likely to drive costs up
rather than reduce them. Table 7 is a
summary of these potentially counterproductive approaches and the basic
reasons for the problem.
What is required, in our view, is for the
government to create an environment that
allows cost reduction to occur and to be
rewarded, and then allow that environment
to work. There is ample evidence that
individuals and organizations be creative in
reducing space mission cost, and can find
ways to do business differently, if they are
given a reasonable opportunity to do so.
Table 8 summarizes actions which the
government can take to create an
environment that reduces cost. On the
whole, these are not easy steps for the
government, in large part because there are
many things which are ultimately more
important than reducing cost. For example,
the government needs to preserve a very
strong image of fairness in its contracting
process. In many respects, organizational
accountability is much more important than

Summary:
Implement a Proactive
Program
Reducing cost is hard work. It takes a
skilled and competent team which is
knowledgeable in the engineering of the
systems involved; it requires inventing
things; it requires management judgment;
and some level of faith in the people who
are actually doing the work. It is hard, if
not impossible, to fully manage or
orchestrate the process of reducing cost.
The strongest approach to reducing cost is
rather like the Nike television commercial,
'Just do it!" To reduce cost, an organization
should create a proactive program tha t
consciously looks at specific ways to reduce
cost. It should be set aside from the main
program in order to avoid hindering rather
than helping. At the same time it must
have the support and attention of th e
program manager and lead system engineer.
They must buy into the process, or it cannot
succeed because the approaches will never
be implemented.
At the government level, the previous
section lists items to avoid and suggestions
for positive approaches. Basically, the key
elements for government are to foster
research aimed specifically at cost; to spend
some portion of program resources on looking
at ways to reduce cost; and to devote
approximately 20% of new initiative
dollars on alternative approaches and
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technologies that might not be successful,
but offer potential cost breakthroughs.
Lastly, and perhaps most important, we
strongly recommend that all of us try and
learn from others, and how they have done
it. Reducing space mission cost is not a new
activity or something that has never been
done. There are many organizations in the
United States, Europe, and elsewhere that
have been doing this for years. One piece of
advice provided at every SMAD tutorial
over the last five years still holds: if you
are interested in low-cost solutions, attend
the
AIAA/Utah
State
University
SmallSat Conference. Listen, read the
papers, and talk to people in the corridors.
It remains the best advice.
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TABLE 2. Cost Summary for Reducing Space Mission Cost Case Study Missions. Because of strong differences in performance,
requirements, and infrastructure, costs are not comparable between missions. However, the overall taDle allows an estimate of what
can be achieved in terms of reducing mission cost. SSCM refers to the Small Satellite Cost Model which is intended to provide a
more realistic estimate of the cost of small satellites (1] Note: For cost/kg in last 2 rows, $1/g = $1 Klkg.

1. The 0rsted payload cost Includes $3.2M of pre-launch and post-launch science support that would not be a part of traditional mission budgets. 2. SAMPEX was initiated under more
traditional costing rules and practices and changed to a '10w cosf mission late in the procurement process. 3. HETE payload cost Includes estimate of foreign contributions, initial ops and
maintenance cost, substantial technical software integration costs that are usually Included in the spacecraft bus cost. 4. The SSCM cost estimate is not applicable to interplanetary spacecraft.
Values listed are intended only for comparison. 5. Costs given are for the Pluto Express, FY'95 configuration. (See case study for discussion) To facilitate system trades, the program intentionally
avoided traditional categories and broke the cost Into mission development (spacecraft + grnd seg). launch system, and mission operations and data analysis. Here mission development Is in "spc
bus" and the payload has been separately casted. 6. For RADCAL. the $4.4M spacecraft Included the payload and 2 ground stations. The military provided operations at an unknown cost. Total cost is
$16.6M + Operations and Maintenance. 7. For ORBCOMM. ground segment cost is for spacecraft control center only. Network Control Center and Gateway Earth Station costs are excluded. 8. Most of
the AMSAT labor provided at no cost. Paid labor would raise cost by approximately a factor of 10.
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------------------Table 3

Ratios of Actual Cost to Projected Cost for Reducing Space Mission Cost Case Study Missions. Because of strong
differences in performance, requirements, and infrastructure, costs are not comparable between missions. However, the overall table
allows an estimate of what can be achieved in terms of reducing mission cost. pr~ected costs are based on the cost model for
traditional programs given by won~ in Chap. 20 of SMA 0 f2~. When payload is inclu ed in spacecraft bus cost, then space segment
cost (= bus + payloaa) provides a etter representation 0 t e cost ratio.

Bus

Payfoad

SQaceS~.

Lau.nch

GmdSf19

2.8%
0.9%
1.80/0

in spcraft
in spcraft
inspcraft

1.80/0
0.5%
1.10/0

0.4%
0.20/0
0.30/0

31.8%
28.20/0
82.2%
16.3%
12.30/0
42.7%
4.4%
31.10/0

27.1 %
18.5%
41.1%
59.4%
in spcraft
in spcraft
1 .9%
28.90/0

29.80/0
24.1%
64.7 %
35.1%
8.2%
24.9%
3.3%
26.90/0

Clementfne
Pluto Express
Average

88.5%
19.8%
54.20/0

24.0%
1 8.0%
21.00/0

72.2%
19.7 %
46.0%

19.9%

Avg .. All exe. AO
A vg .. All Missions

36.30/0
30.00/0

27.10/0
27.10/0

31.3%
25.80/0

32.0%
26.20/0

Qo.s.

f Main

To.tal Prog

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A

N/A

1.00/0
0.30/0
0.70/0

12.1%
7.20/0
93.9%
42.2%
73.3%
18.1%
1 .6%
35.50/0

4.2%
0.7 %
14.2%
1 .4%
in spcraft
0.2%
0.7%
3.60/0

33.90/0
4.10/0
109.2%
in payload
6.1%
4.20/0
31.50/0

51.10/0
14.4%
14.7%
4.2%
2.2%
16.5%

32.1 %
7 .6%

1 .9 %
in spcraft
1.9%

54.1 %
14.0%
34.00/0

36.30/0
15.8%
26.10/0

32.2%

18.60/0
15.30/0

AMSAT

AO-13
AO-16
Average
Other LEO

IlJrsted
Freja
SA MPEX
HETE
RADCAL
ORBCOMM
PoSAT-1
Average
InterglaD~tgr~

3.30/0
3.3%

N/A

32.2%

19.60/0
9.0%
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Table 4.

Summary of Cost Reduction Methods. How the rules are applied is the key to
reducing cost. (Adapted from RSMC [1].)

Metbod
Programmatic
Schedule Compression

Mechanl~m

comm~nts

Reduces overhead of standing army;
forcing program to move rapidly does
drive down cost

Onen results in a poor design due to
lack of up-front mission engineering;
must reduce work required to be
consistent with schedule
Reduce Cost of Failure
Fear of failure feeds cost-growth spiral;
Allows both ambitiOUS goals and
calculated risk in order to make major
major breakthroughs require accepting
progress
the possibility of failure-particularly in
test
Continuous, Stable
Maintains program continuity; maintains Program delay will be funding break +
Funding
team together
2-4 months
Minimize Documentation Heduces programmatic overhead for
Cntlcal to document reasons for key
creating, reviewing, & maintaining
decisions and as-built design
Pe[§'QnOf!.1
Improved interpersonal
Large programs use formal, structured
Dramatically reduces errors and
communications
communications through specified
omissions; conveys understanding as
well as data
channels
Small Team
Problem if a key person drops out -Clear, nearly instantaneous
but in practice it rarely happens.
communications; high morale; strong
sense of personal responsibility
Co-located Team
Best communications are face-to-face,
Improves communications
but AMSAT and others don't seem to
need it
Empowered Project
Eliminates a major function of the
Rapid deCISion making; strong sense
Team
management structure
. of personal responsibility; can make
"sensible" decisions
s~stem~ Engine.eOag
Trading on
Makes traditional competition difficult
Eliminates non-cratlcal requirements;
Re~uirements
permits use of low-cost technology
Concurrent Engineenng
Allows schedule compression; reduces High non-recurring cost relative to lowest
mistakes; increases feedback between cost programs; can achieve optimal
design
engineerinQ and manufacturing
Design-to-Cost
Spacecraft have rarely used It
Adjusts requirements and approach
until cost goal has been achieved;
makes cost paramount
Large Margins
Margins traditionally kept small for best
Heduces testing; better flexibility;
performance-drives up development
reduces cost of engineering,
manufacturing, and operations
cost
Te.chnQ/Qr/X
Use COTS SoftWare
May need modification and thorough
Immediate availability; dramatically
testing; typically not optimal for
lower cost; tested through use
application
Use COTS Hardware
Same as software
Same as software
Use Existing Spares
Reduced cost; rapid availability; meant Can only do thiS so long as spares
exist -- not applicable for operational
for space
programs
Use of non-space
Takes advantage of eXlstmg designs
TYPically not optimal; must be space
equipment
and potential for mass production
Qualified
Autonomous systems
Can Increase non-recumng cost
Heduces operations costs
Has been remarkably unsuccessful in
Standardized
Reduces cost and risk by reusmg
space; sub-optimal in terms of weight
components and
hardware; standardization is a major
interfaces
and power
requirement for other types of
manufacturin~

ExtenSive Use of
Microprocessors

Minimizes weight; provides high
capability in a small package; allows
on-orbit reprogramming

Common SIW for Test
and Operations

Reduces both cost and schedule;
avoids reinventing the wheel

Problem of Single-event upsets; high
cost of flight software; very difficult to
manage and control software
development
May be less efficient, user-friendly than
opsgroup would prefer
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------------------*

indicates methods regarded as being of particular Importance for that mission. Data for the BremSat
case study [3] has been added to that from RSMC. Other methods regarded as important by the authors include focused, limrted objectives; strong. up-front systems engineering; use of
experienced, skilled personnel; provide a strong technical challenge; and tight management control.
Table 5. Methods of Cost Reduction Applied by RSMC Case Study Missions.

.Mmb.Qd

a:

EJ

Sx

Hf1

L~~

lEE

Bil

.Qr

Am.

•
•

•

*•

•
•

*

•
•

•
•

~

~rQgrammati~

Schedule Compression
Reduce Cost of Failure
Continuous, Stable Funding
Minimize Documentation

•
•

•
•

•

*

•

•

•
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

*•

•
•

•

•

•

•
•
•

•

Pe(§.onnel

Improved interpersonal communications
Small Team
Co-Iocated Team
Empowered Project Team

•

s.mfl~ Eoginflfld.ng

•

*• * *• *•
* * •
*

Trading on Requirements

•

Concurrent Engineering
Design-to-Cost
Large Margins

•
•
•

*•

•

•

•
•
•

•

•

•

•

*

•
•
•
•

•
•

=*

*
*

•

*
•
•
•

•

TechD.QlQ~

Use COTS Software

•

Use COTS Hardware

•

•
•

•

•

Use Existing Spares

•

Use of non-space equipment
Autonomous systems

•

Standardized components and Interfaces

•

Extensive Use of Microprocessors

•

Common SIW for Test and Operations

•

*I*

•

•
•

•

•

•
•

•
•

*
*

•
•
•
•

*

•
•
•
•
•

*
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Table 6.

Construction and Design Philosophy for Case Study Missions. As in Table 5, the BremSat case study mission [3] has been added. Most authors stressed the importance
of extensive testing as critical to a successful low-cost satellite program.

Design Aggroach

0r

.Ej

Sx

He

CI

PE

Ra

Or

Am

Po

Br

1 = Build vs. 5

3

3

1

1

2

1

1

3

1

1

2

1

3

3

3

1

1

1

4

5

4

2

5

5

5

3

5

5

5

1

3

2

4

4

2

3

3

3

1

1

3

3

3

4

3

3

1

1

1

1

3

3

5

3

3

na

4

na

1

1

1

2

2

5

5

2

Ves

No

No

No

No

No

Ves

No

Ves

Ves

No

= Buy
1 = Best parts vs. 5 = Low cost parts
1 = Sys. level testing vs. 5 = all levels
1 =QA In-house vs. 5 = contractor
1 = High tech vs. 5 = low tech
1 = New each time vs. 5 = evolutionary
Design for multiple launch vehicles

I
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TABLE 7

Potentially Counterproductive System Acquisition Approaches to Reducing Space Mission Cost. Each is
intended to reduce cost, but has a high probability of increasing cost instead. (from RSMC [1].)
A~roach

Potential Benefit

Disadvantages

1. Consolidated,
centralized
acquisition and
engineering

Provides greater accountability;
gives appearance of reducing
waste

Likely to force out small organizations
and innovative approaches; likely to lock
in higtr-cost approaches

2. Contractor cost
sharing of
development costs

Reduces cost to the govemment if
major customers are in the private
sector (e.g., computer
development)

Forces out the small player; investment
economics drive acquisition-will
require very large ROI, because the
govemment is a high-risk customer

3. Contractor cost
sharing in up-front
studies

Reduces study cost

Forces out the small, innovative
contractor; contractor costs will be
recovered in higher indirect rates

4. Cost guarantee
on R&D programs

Limits govemment cost
commitment; good for achieving
accountability but not for reducing
cost

Forces out the small contractor and
doesn't permit taking risks that could
dramatically reduce cost

5. Doing work in-

Eliminates subcontracting cost;
can be effective if the group has
experience with low-cost, efficient
production

May drive up costs due to lack of
efficiency and knowledge; may be
largely an excuse to maintain a large
infrastructure

Shortens program schedule and
avoids over-engineering a
strawman deSign

cost or improving performance

I

I
I

house

6. Reducing the
level of up-front
systems
engineering

TABLES.

Ignorance is rarely of value in reducing

I

Actions the Government Can Take to Create an Environment That Reduces Cost. Direct government
policies and actions are far more likely to increase cost rather than reduce cost. However, creating an environment
in which inventive organizations and individuals can work effectively can foster cost reduction. (from RSMC [1]).

Action or
Comment
A roach
1. Force trading on
Make this a formal process by or with the
re uirements
erformin
ization or contractor
1--:2
:;-".-::R:::"'eq-----':-ui......
re......strong-=-----+..L:-A-::-;n......
prog..;......;..';";'OZ"
have strong, formal system
trades, ongoing utility analysis, and up-front
mission engineering
mission en
3. Provide continuous
Force decisio
n subsequent phases in
arallel with current ase
eward low cost
Find mechanisms to reward (and not punish) all
individuals and organizations which contribute to
reducin cost
5. Reduce the cost of
Recognize the need to allow reasonable risk and
failure
failure rates in test and R&D activities
6. Make cost data
Getting the lowest-cost solution is essentially
i available
impossible unless the engineers designing the
stem know what the costs are
7. Decentralize space
Innovation comes from small businesses and
system procurement
"secondary" organizations within the government
Work with them.
8. Sponsor R&D to
Make reducing cost an alternative and acceptable
reduce cost
objective for R&D, without demanding that it
simultaneousl "advance technolo
9. Sponsor knowledge
Space technology has dramatically fewer books,
preservation and
commercial software, or university programs
dissemination
than any other major discipline. Knowledge is
di
e
ve r ·dl.
10. Revise the
Sm companies are a rnajor source of
SBIRrules
innovative approaches to cost reduction, but
current rules discoura e them
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